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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-08 credit crisis in the United States, precipitated by defaults on 
subprime mortgages, resulted from a classic debt bubble, featuring massive 
borrowing on the basis of rapidly inflating asset values, in this case residen-
tial real estate.1  Debt crises can be resolved quickly or slowly.  Crisis reso-
lution invariably requires that the underlying asset values return to normal 
levels and that debt which will never be paid off by borrowers be written 
 
* Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  My thanks to Kevin Byers for 
his invaluable assistance in identifying and locating the remittance report data, and to 
Patricia McCoy for her reliably thoughtful comments. 
 1. See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 
08-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1255362. 
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off, with or without massive transfers of the underlying assets.2  The re-
valuation of assets and write-down of debt can be accomplished in several 
ways, including government bailouts, currency inflation (which shifts 
losses from borrowers to lenders), legislation, asset seizures by lenders and 
subsequent resales, or by the slow workings of the market.3  The losses can 
be borne by lenders, borrowers, taxpayers, or some combination of these.4  
To take an example from the Great Depression, U.S. debts were written 
down by 50% or more in 1935 through the legislative expedient of voiding 
gold clauses in contracts.5  Taxpayers absorbed the losses from the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s.6  Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s offers an 
example of the slow and agonizing approach to resolving a debt crisis.  The 
central bank and government were unwilling to require banks to write 
down their assets and instead allowed overvalued debts to remain on the 
books in the vain hope that they could eventually be repaid, causing a huge 
drag on the national economy for more than a decade.7 
Home mortgage debt in the United States mushroomed from about $4 
trillion in 1998 to $10 trillion in 2007.8  During the same decade, the me-
dian income remained virtually unchanged in constant dollars,9 and the 
number of homeowners rose at a relatively modest pace.10  Inevitably, 
homeownership has become progressively less affordable, and the ability 
of Americans to service their growing mortgage debt has reached a break-
 
 2. Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Randall Kroszner, Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive?  An Empirical Analysis of 
the Impact of Debt Repudiation (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/Kroszner.pdf. 
 6. Timothy Curry & Lynne Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:  Truth 
and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26 (2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf. 
 7. See Tim Callen & Jonathan D. Ostry, Overview, in JAPAN’S LOST DECADE:  POLICIES 
FOR ECONOMIC REVIVAL 1, 5 (Tim Callen & Jonathan D. Ostry eds., 2003). 
 8. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE:  FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES:  FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 
FIRST QUARTER 2008, at 8 (2008). 
 9. The median income for 1998 was $48,034 and for 2006 was $48,201 in constant 
2006 dollars.  CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2006, at 29 tbl.A-1 (2007), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf. 
 10. Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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ing point.11  The rapid growth of subprime mortgage lending was an impor-
tant contributor to the mortgage debt bubble. 
In the case of the August 2007 collapse in the subprime mortgage mar-
ket, U.S. policy-makers have recognized the need for some sort of interven-
tion to readjust home values and mortgage debt, but have to date been un-
willing to use the tools of taxpayer-funded bailouts or legislated debt 
reduction.  Instead, the Treasury Department encouraged voluntary efforts 
by mortgage servicers, on behalf of the investors holding the inflated debt, 
to renegotiate the terms of residential mortgages.12  Lenders and mortgage 
servicers, faced with rapidly escalating foreclosure rates, plunging home 
prices, and mounting losses, were exhorted to renegotiate mortgage terms 
with borrowers in order to stave off even more widespread defaults and 
foreclosures. 
A year into the crisis, it is possible to begin evaluating the success or 
failure of these voluntary efforts to resolve the debt overhang by renegotia-
ting contracts one at a time, albeit on an unprecedented scale.  Data on vol-
untary mortgage modifications are available from a number of sources, in-
cluding the HOPE NOW ad hoc coalition of mortgage servicers and 
counselors, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and the working group of 
state banking and consumer credit regulators working on the foreclosure 
crisis.13  These data provide some evidence as to the effectiveness of the 
voluntary restructuring approach, which aims to avoid any taxpayer contri-
bution and to allocate losses between borrowers and lenders on a negoti-
ated, and hopefully optimal basis.14  On the other hand, the various avail-
able reports do not specify what kind of modifications are implemented, 
and the degree, if any, to which mortgage debt is being reduced to a more 
sustainable level. 
 
 11. See Christopher L. Foote et al., Subprime Facts:  What (We Think) We Know about 
the Subprime Crisis and What We Don’t 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy 
Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/ 
2008/ppdp0802.pdf (discussing background of subprime crisis and the importance of the 
rise and fall in home prices). 
 12. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 13. See JAY BRINKMAN, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, AN EXAMINATION OF MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURES, MODIFICATIONS, REPAYMENT PLANS, AND OTHER LOSS MITIGATION 
ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 2007 (2008); STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 
WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE:  DATA 
REPORT NO. 2 (2008), available at http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080422.pdf; HOPE 
NOW Industry Data, http://www.hopenow.com/industry_data.html. 
 14. Alice Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Metro. Policy Program, Remarks at the State Summit 
on Foreclosure and Housing Solutions:  State and Federal Policy in the Foreclosure Crises 
(May 28, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0528_foreclosure_ 
rivlin.aspx. 
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To supplement the national reports on mortgage modifications, this pa-
per analyzes data derived from monthly remittance reports by mortgage 
servicers to their investors, which provide rich detail on individual mort-
gage foreclosures and modifications.  The selected sample consisted of 
monthly reports from July 2007 through June 2008 for twenty-six different 
subprime loan pools, and included data on 4,344 loan modifications.  The 
data include the loan balance, monthly payment and interest rate, before 
and after modification.  This Article will begin by reviewing some history 
of the voluntary plan to resolve the subprime mortgage crisis and the previ-
ous reports on voluntary loan modifications.  It will then present the new 
data from remittance reports, and in particular on two key outcomes of loan 
modifications: whether total mortgage debt is being reduced, and whether 
monthly payments for individual homeowners are reduced. 
I.  LOSS MITIGATION AND LOAN MODIFICATIONS:  THE VOLUNTARY 
APPROACH 
While bankruptcy regimes can be a useful means to realign debts and as-
set values, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code specifically forbids bankruptcy 
judges from modifying most residential mortgages by reducing the debt to 
the market value of the property.15  Efforts in Congress to amend the Bank-
ruptcy Code and permit judges to impose debt restructuring through princi-
pal reduction have thus far met stiff resistance from the banking industry, 
and consequentially have been stymied.16  Without a bankruptcy regime (or 
something comparable) as a coercive tool, homeowners have little choice 
but to attempt to negotiate concessions, such as interest rate reductions or 
payment deferrals, individually with their servicers. 
A significant portion of the $10.5 trillion in mortgage debt owed by 
Americans by 200817 consisted of subprime mortgages, and this trend con-
tinues to grow.18  By the end of 2007 mortgage debt exceeded total aggre-
gate home equity (in other words, Americans had borrowed more than half 
 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 324 
(1993); Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on 
Mortgage Markets (Georgetown Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087816 . 
 16. Kevin Drawbaugh, Senate Kills Bankruptcy Revamp In Housing Bill, REUTERS, Apr. 
3, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/telecomm/idUSN0319323820080403; Tim Taylor, 
Durbin Bankruptcy Amendment Fails, ROLL CALL, Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.rollcall.com/ 
news/breakingnews/22815-1.html?CMP=OTC-RSS. 
 17. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 8, at 8. 
 18. About 5.5 million out of 45 million, or 12% of all mortgages outstanding at the end 
of March 2008 were subprime.  MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY 
SURVEY Q1-2008 (2008). 
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the value of all homes in the country) for the first time.19  Although home 
prices began declining in 2007, and dropped by 20% or more in some ar-
eas, housing affordability had not improved much by the middle of 2008 
because home prices were still out of the reach of many Americans.20 
The subprime credit crisis reached the breaking point in August 2007 af-
ter several investment funds relying heavily on subprime mortgage deriva-
tives collapsed, securities affected by subprime defaults were discovered in 
bank portfolios around the world, interbank lending suddenly froze, and the 
Federal Reserve and European Central Bank had to inject billions of dollars 
and euros into the international financial system.21  As the subprime crisis 
unfolded, home values that had risen to unsustainable levels began to de-
cline.22  At the same time, increasing numbers of homeowners defaulted on 
their mortgages and faced foreclosure.23  Investors had assumed that in the 
event of defaults, securities backed by U.S. home mortgages would be safe, 
because the homes securing the mortgages could be foreclosed and sold to 
recover any unpaid loans.  In practice, however, subprime mortgage ser-
vicers rarely recover 100% of the debt in a foreclosure.24  After the 2007 
crisis, the combined effect of high foreclosure rates and plummeting home 
values meant that foreclosure recovery rates (usually measured as loss se-
verities25) progressively worsened.  Bond rating agencies have predicted 
loss severities on subprime foreclosures as high as 50%.26 
 
 19. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2008, at 7 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/ 
son2008/ son2008.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 21. 
 21. See Larry Elliott, Credit Crisis-How it All Began, GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2008, at 22, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/aug/05/northernrock.banking. 
 22. Home prices in the United States more than doubled between 1997 and 2006, before 
falling more than 15% from 2007 to 2008.  See CSI:  Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 
2007, at 4, available at http://www.economist.com/specialreports/display story.cfm?story_ 
id=9972489; Peter Hong, Home Prices Drop by Record 15.8% in May, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 
2008, at C3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/29/business/fi-homes30. 
 23. See White, supra note 10; Vikas Bajaj, Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan 
Defaults, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A1. 
 24. See Glen Schultz et al., Modeling Nonprime Mortgage Prepayment, Delinquency 
and Default, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 752-53 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi ed., 6th ed. 2006) (reporting that historical subprime losses consistently exceeded 
30%). 
 25. Loss severity is the ratio of the loss on a loan to the unpaid balance due.  See Tho-
mas Zimmerman & Laurent Gauthier, Mortgage Credit Quantified, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, supra note 24, at 951, 970-72. 
 26. See FRANCIS PARISI & THOMAS G. GILLIS, STANDARD & POOR’S REVISES U.S. 
SUBPRIME, PRIME, AND ALTERNATIVE-A RMBS LOSS ASSUMPTIONS (2008), 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime_prime_alt-a_072908.pdf; see 
also FITCH RATINGS, ESCALATING COSTS IMPACTING RMBS LOSSES (2008), 
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In this environment, it makes economic sense for mortgage servicers, on 
behalf of lenders and investors, to seek alternatives to foreclosure by re-
structuring mortgage loans with borrowers, where the borrower can be ex-
pected to repay even 80% or 90% of the original debt.27  Wooden insis-
tence on adherence to the original contract terms may result in the servicer 
recovering far less than if the contract is modified.  Borrowers who are un-
able to pay subprime mortgages on their original terms may be able to 
make reduced monthly payments.  Payments may be reduced by dropping 
the interest rate or the loan balance, or both.  Borrowers whose mortgage 
debt exceeds their home value may have an incentive to default, but that 
incentive can be reduced if the servicer agrees to write down the loan bal-
ance to the property value.28  Resolution of the mortgage debt crisis with-
out truly massive foreclosures thus depends on loan modifications that ac-
complish two things: reducing principal debt and reducing monthly 
payments.  Based on these arguments, Bush Administration officials and 
bank regulators called on mortgage servicers to negotiate interest rate and 
principal reductions by modifying mortgage contracts, as an alternative to 
foreclosure, in appropriate cases.29 
Securitization of mortgages has added layers of difficulty to the task of 
loss mitigation for subprime mortgages.30  Servicers face constraints on 
 
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report_frame.cfm?rpt_id=391428&sector_fla
g=20&marketsector=1&detail=3. 
 27. PATRICIA MCCOY & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADITIONAL HOME 
MORTGAGES 34 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/ 
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf; Sheila C. Bair, Fore-
word, The Case for Loan Modification, FDIC Q. Third Quarter 2007, at 22, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2007_vol1_3/FeatureArticle_1_V1N3_Full.p
df. 
 28. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Independent Commu-
nity Bankers of America Annual Convention: Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures 
(March 4, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke 
20080304a.htm. 
 29. Id.; see also Blair, supra note 27.  The F.H.A. mortgage insurance program operated 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has a long-standing formal 
program to mitigate foreclosure losses by, among other things, permitting modifications to 
existing mortgage contracts for homeowners in payment distress.  See Letter from John C. 
Weicher, Assistant Sec’y for Hous. & Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban 
Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/ 
hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/05-18ml.doc. 
 30. Securitization is the process of pooling mortgages or other financial assets and sell-
ing the rights to various portions of the resulting cash flow to investors in complex bond 
structures.  The trustee for the investors retains a servicer to collect mortgage payments and 
distribute them to the investors.  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a 
Blind Eye:  Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007). 
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their ability to renegotiate mortgages, and have little economic incentive to 
incur the additional cost of loan modifications.31 
On October 10, 2007 Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. an-
nounced the formation of a coalition of mortgage servicers and housing 
counseling agencies, called HOPE NOW, to stimulate a voluntary effort to 
restructure mortgages, and ostensibly to respond to the subprime foreclo-
sure crisis without mandatory debt restructuring measures or a taxpayer-
financed bailout.32  In December 2007, the HOPE NOW coalition an-
nounced an initiative to encourage mortgage servicers to “freeze” interest 
rates on certain adjustable-rate mortgage (“ARM”) loans to prevent fore-
closures resulting from sudden payment increases.33 Apart from the rate 
freeze plan, HOPE NOW functioned primarily to exhort various industry 
participants to increase efforts to prevent foreclosures, and to collect and 
report data on the success of those exhortations.34 
The payment increases targeted by the rate freeze plan were the result of 
hybrid ARM structures where the initial interest rate was lower than the 
rate in effect for most of the loan life, the latter being calculated by adding 
an index rate to the stipulated margin.35  Although the initial interest rates 
on subprime ARMs were not particularly low, the loans were designed so 
that a payment increase due to the rate reset was inevitable after two to 
three years.36  While much attention was focused on the payment reset is-
sue, it has become apparent that the subprime foreclosure crisis was not a 
result of payment resets, but instead reflected the fact that many subprime 
mortgage payments were unaffordable from the date of origination.37 
The HOPE NOW servicer coalition reports, issued beginning in Febru-
ary 2008, noted the significant increase in voluntary loan modification 
 
 31. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is 
Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”:  What Prevents Loan Modifica-
tions?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279 (2007). 
 32. See Press Release, HOPE NOW, HOPE NOW Alliance Created to Help Distressed 
Homeowners (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/hope_now/pdfs/Alliance 
Release.pdf. 
 33. Edmund L. Andrews, In Mortgage Plan, Lenders Set Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2007, at A1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Beverlea Gardner & Dennis C. Ankenbrand, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Hybrid 
ARMs:  Addressing the Risk, Managing the Fallout, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2008, 
at 14, 16, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/ 
sisum08/sisum08.pdf. 
 36. Predatory Lending and Home Foreclosures:  Hearing Before the S. Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Oper-
ating Officer, Self-Help Credit Union and the Center for Responsible Lending). 
 37. See Foote et al., supra note 11. 
WHITE_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:56:46 PM 
516 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
agreements, as well as repayment plans, beginning in the last quarter of 
2007.38  HOPE NOW estimated that 140,000 mortgages were modified in 
the fourth quarter of 2007, 170,000 in the first quarter of 2008, and 220,000 
in the second quarter of 2008.39  The HOPE NOW surveys did not include 
information on the type of modifications being offered by its members. 
A working group of state consumer protection and bank supervisor 
agencies issued a report in April 2008 that there were 24,000 loan modifi-
cations closed and 139,000 “in process” in the four-month period from Oc-
tober 2007 through January 2008.40  The state regulators also noted that 
many payment plans and proposed modifications were started but not com-
pleted.41  Although it does not provide numbers, the report comments that 
freezing the interest rate on variable-rate mortgages was the most common 
modification.42  The HOPE NOW and state regulator reports chose to em-
phasize different aspects of the same data.  HOPE NOW pointed to the 
large increase in raw numbers of payment plans and modifications, while 
also acknowledging the even larger increase in foreclosure starts and 
sales.43  The state regulators highlighted the gap between total delinquen-
cies and modifications, and the gap between workout efforts initiated and 
completed agreements, suggesting that many homeowners were seeking 
help but getting “lost in the shuffle.”44  Although the state regulators rec-
ognized the importance of determining what kind of modifications are im-
plemented, they have not provided statistical information on that question 
to date. 
The Mortgage Bankers Association (“MBA”) responded to industry crit-
ics with its own survey of mortgage foreclosures, payment plans, and modi-
fication agreements in January 2008.45  The MBA reported that servicers 
encountered significant difficulty contacting borrowers in foreclosure, 23% 
of whom made no response to servicers’ attempts to contact them.46  The 
MBA survey also found that 29% of borrowers in foreclosure had already 
 
 38. See HOPE NOW industry data, supra note 13. 
 39. Id.  The 220,000 modifications in the 2nd quarter of 2008 can be compared with 
246,000 completed foreclosure sales and 573,000 foreclosure starts in the same quarter. 
 40. STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, supra note 13, app. a. 
 41. Id. at 7-8. 
 42. Id. at 9. 
 43. See HOPE NOW industry data, supra note 13. 
 44. See CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL., THE GROWING CHASM BETWEEN WORDS AND 
DEEDS:  LENDERS STILL FAILING TO LIVE UP TO THEIR PUBLIC COMMITMENTS TO MODIFY 
HOME LOANS AND HELP BORROWERS AVOID FORECLOSURE 4 (2007) (reporting results from 
survey of housing counselors and finding dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of mort-
gage servicers and their willingness to modify mortgages to prevent foreclosures). 
 45. See BRINKMAN, supra note 13. 
 46. Id. at 10. 
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defaulted on prior repayment plans.47  The thrust of the MBA report was 
that the disproportion between loan modifications and the total number of 
mortgage foreclosures could be explained in part by these two factors.48 
While investors and rating agencies are understandably skeptical about 
servicers and borrowers who repeatedly enter into unrealistic payment or 
modification plans that are unlikely to succeed,49 consumer advocates point 
out that many servicers have offered cookie-cutter repayment plans that re-
quire increased monthly payments; this at a time when homeowners cannot 
afford their current payments.  If servicers would cut interest rates, princi-
pal balances, and monthly payments, more loan modifications would suc-
ceed and result in on-time repayment.  Consumer advocates have also criti-
cized mortgage servicers for devoting inadequate personnel and resources 
to the modification effort and for showing a lack of sensitivity to the plight 
of homeowners.50 
Loss mitigation can take many forms.51  First, to deal with payment ar-
rears, a servicer can add the unpaid interest for the months in arrears to the 
total loan balance and then calculate a new (necessarily higher) monthly 
payment that will amortize the increased balance over the remaining 
months of the mortgage life.52  Without a modification of the principal or 
interest rate, reamortizing plans neither reduce mortgage debt nor diminish 
the payment stress faced by the borrower.53 
Second, the rate freeze modifications also do not diminish mortgage debt 
or payment stress, except insofar as they prevent payments from increasing 
due to future rate adjustments.  While a rate freeze may help prevent some 
loans from going into default, it will not help a borrower who had difficulty 
meeting the initial loan payment.  There is considerable evidence that rate 
resets on hybrid ARMs have not been the primary cause of the foreclosure 
crisis of 2007-2008.54 
A third type of loan modification addresses payment stress by reducing 
the interest rate in order to reduce the monthly payment.  An interest-only 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. The bond rating agency Moody’s reported in July 2008 that nearly half of the mort-
gages modified in the first half of 2007 were in serious default by March 2008, and only 
about one-third were still current or paid in full.  AASHISH MARFATIA, MOODY’S SUBPRIME 
ARM LOAN MODIFICATION UPDATE (2008); see CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. supra note 44. 
 50. See Gretchen Morgensen, Silence of the Lenders:  Is Anyone Listening?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2008, at BU1. 
 51. See MCCOY & RENUART, supra note 27, at 32. 
 52. CREDIT SUISSE, SUBPRIME LOAN MODIFICATIONS UPDATE 3 (2008). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Foote et al., supra note 11. 
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reduction deals with payment stress as a cause of default and foreclosure, 
but does not reduce the homeowner’s overall mortgage debt, or deal with 
the negative equity problem that results when home values decline below 
the amount owed. 
A fourth type of loan modification would reduce principal debt and the 
interest rate to deal with both payment stress and negative equity issues.  
This fourth category of modifications is still largely theoretical, and has not 
been used to any significant degree. 
The previous reports on the number of modifications do not answer im-
portant questions about the effectiveness of the voluntary mortgage resolu-
tion plan.  They do not reveal whether overall mortgage debt is being re-
duced, nor whether monthly payment burdens are being eased.  The data 
reported in this Article can begin to answer these questions. 
II.  STUDY METHOD 
Loan-level data on individual mortgage modifications and individual 
foreclosures are available for one segment of the market: subprime mort-
gages that were pooled and securitized.  Trustees and their servicing com-
panies report monthly to investors on the performance of the mortgage 
loans.55  These monthly performance reports, known as remittance reports, 
provide loan-by-loan details on defaults, foreclosures, losses on foreclosed 
homes, and negotiated loan modifications.56 
Mortgage servicers prepare monthly remittance reports for the investors 
who hold a stake in securitized mortgage loan pools.  These monthly re-
ports allow investors to see how the underlying mortgages are performing, 
with detailed data about prepayments, defaults, foreclosures, losses and 
loan modifications.  The remittance reports are not filed with any public 
agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and their avail-
ability varies by servicer and trustee.  In addition, different securitization 
trustees and servicers provide different data elements and detail in their 
monthly reports.  For this study, I used the reports made available by CTS 
Link, the Wells Fargo trust service web site.57  These cover mortgage pools 
for which Wells Fargo serves as trustee; the pools are serviced by many of 
the leading mortgage servicing companies. 
 
 55. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Investor Reporting, https://tss.sfs.db.com/investpublic/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2009); Global Corporate Trust Reporting, https://gctinvestorreporting 
.bnymellon.com/Home.jsp# (last visited Feb. 24, 2009); Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Ser-
vices, www.ctslink.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
 56. See supra note 55. 
 57. See Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra note 55. 
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In order to accumulate a reasonable data set of mortgages facing foreclo-
sure that are a likely candidate for modification, I selected twenty-six pools 
of subprime loans originated in 2005 and 2006, containing approximately 
106,000 mortgage loans.  Preference was given to the largest available sin-
gle pools.  These pools were most likely to consist of subprime, primarily 
adjustable mortgages, with significant numbers of mortgages remaining 
during the 2007–2008 reporting period, and with many potential candidates 
for mortgage modifications.  Monthly reports were collected for a twelve-
month period, from July 2007 through June 2008.  The HOPE NOW initia-
tive was announced in the early part of this period, and national reports in-
dicate a rapid growth in the number of mortgage modifications during this 
time frame.58 
Remittance reports were downloaded and entered into a database from 
the following twenty-six loan pools: 
 
Table 1:  Mortgage pools in Study Sample 
Pool name Originator Servicer 
ABFC 2005-OPT1 Option One Option One 
ABFC 2006-OPT1 Option One Option One 
ABFC 2006-OPT2 Option One Option One 
ABFC 2006-OPT3  Option One Option One 
Aames MIT 2005-4 Aames Mortgage Aames Funding 
Aames MIT 2006-1 Aames Mortgage Aames Funding 
ACE Securities 2006-CW1 Countrywide Countrywide 
ACE Securities 2006FM-1 Fremont Fremont 
First Franklin LT 2005-FF6 First Franklin First Franklin 
FFLT 2006-FF1 First Franklin First Franklin 
FFLT 2006-FF11 First Franklin First Franklin 
Fremont HLTrust 2005A Fremont Fremont 
Fremont HLTrust 2006A Fremont Fremont 
HSIASC WMC2006-1 WMC Wells Fargo 
JPMAC2006-CW2 Countrywide Countrywide 
Merrill Lynch MIT 2006-1 WMC Wells Fargo 
Park Place 2005WHQ1 Argent/Ameriquest HomEq 
Park Place 2005 WHQ4 Argent HomEq 
Renaissance HELT2006-1 Delta Ocwen 
Renaissance HELT2005-1 Delta Ocwen 
SASCO 2006BC6 Various Aurora 
 
 58. HOPE NOW industry data, supra note 13. 
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WFHET 2005-1 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo 
WFHET 2005-2 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo 
WFHET 2005-4 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo 
WFHET 2006-2 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo 
WFHET2006-3 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo 
 
Descriptive statistics were calculated using Excel 2008 for Macintosh v. 
12.0 and SPSS 16.0 for Macintosh. 
Countrywide and Wells Fargo were the number one and two originators, 
respectively, of mortgages in all categories in 2006.59  The sample includes 
seven of the top ten subprime originators in 200660 and six of the top fif-
teen subprime servicers in 2007.61 
This sample obviously has its limitations.  Servicers of securitized loans 
may have different incentives than lenders who retain ownership of mort-
gage loans on their own balance sheets (so-called portfolio lenders).  The 
number and extent of voluntary loan modifications in the sample may not 
be representative of loan modifications by lenders who hold subprime 
mortgages in their own portfolios.  Nevertheless, given that subprime 
mortgages account for more than half of all foreclosures,62 and that the vast 
majority of subprime loans that led to the crisis were securitized, this sam-
ple provides important insights as to what the voluntary debt resolution 
plan has yielded to date in the subprime market. 
For each loan pool, the prospectus prepared for investors was 
downloaded and retained.  The prospectuses and supplements provide de-
tailed descriptions of the pools of mortgage loans.63  Most of the mortgage 
pools in the sample were dominated by hybrid adjustable-rate subprime 
mortgages, although the Renaissance pools originated by Delta Funding 
Corporation were mostly fixed-rate loans.  Many of the pools included sig-
nificant percentages of “no-doc” loans, in other words, mortgages approved 
without verification or documentation of the borrower’s income.  For ex-
ample 52% of the loans in the HSIASC 2006-WMC1 pool were stated in-
 
 59. See INSIDE MORTGAGE FIN., THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 43 
(2008). 
 60. Id. at 217. 
 61. Id. at 241. 
 62. According to the National Delinquency Survey for the first quarter of 2008, 10.74% 
of 5,542,054, (595,000) subprime mortgages, were in foreclosure, compared with 2.47% 
(1,117,000) of all mortgages (45,224,567).  MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 18. 
 63. See, e.g., SEC Info, HSI Asset Securization Corp., Prospectus Supplement (Form 
424b5), at A1-A23, S28-29 (July 6, 2006), http://www.secinfo.com/dr66r.v1Qq.htm. 
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come (no income verification) loans.64  Loans tended to be geographically 
concentrated in California and a few other high-growth states.  In other re-
spects, the mortgages in the study sample were typical of subprime mort-
gages originated in 2005 and 2006. 
III.  LOAN-LEVEL DATA ON MORTGAGE REFINANCINGS, DEFAULTS 
AND LOSSES DURING THE 2007-08 CRISIS 
A. Growing Defaults, Foreclosures and REO 
In July 2007 the average delinquency rate in the pools was 19%, and 
1.4% of all loans entered foreclosure that month (an already disturbing 
16.8% annual rate of foreclosure starts).  By June 2008, the average delin-
quency rate had nearly doubled to 34%, and foreclosure starts were at 2.3% 
per month, or 27% annually.  In all pools, the number of loans entering the 
foreclosure and real-estate-owned (“REO”) categories far outpaced the 
number of prepayments, so that the foreclosure and REO inventory steadily 
increased in every month.  While some increase over time in defaults and 
foreclosures in a static mortgage pool is to be expected, the magnitude of 
the increase in the study period is extraordinary, and is one indication that 
the voluntary resolution plan is falling short. 
B. Losses on Foreclosed Properties:  Loss Severities Worsen 
Mortgage servicers and investors measure the losses on individual mort-
gage loans by comparing the dollar loss incurred to the total outstanding 
mortgage debt.  This ratio is known as “loss severity.”65  Loss severities in-
creased steadily in most pools from July 2007 to June 2008 (see Figure 1).  
By June 2008 loss severities in individual pools ranged from 17% to 71%, 
with the average loss severity running at 38%. 
 
 64. Id. at A20. 
 65. Zimmerman & Gauthier, supra note 25, at 951, 970-72. 
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Figure 1:  Increasing Loss Severities 
 
To take one example from the study data, an Illinois property in the First 
Franklin 2006-F11 pool was originated in late 2006 with a $630,000 origi-
nal balance and a 100% loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratio, and an interest rate of 
10.125%.  The home was foreclosed and sold with a total loss realized in 
June 2008 of $332,000.  A California property in the same month in the 
same pool with an original mortgage balance of $272,000, thought to repre-
sent an 80% LTV ratio, with 7.375% interest, was sold at a loss of 
$185,000.  In either case, had there been a viable homeowner with any rea-
sonable income, it is hard to imagine that a modification reducing principal 
and interest to an affordable level could not have produced a smaller ulti-
mate loss for investors than wiping out all interest and 52% to 68% of prin-
cipal.  Loss severities are a critical motivating factor for investors and ser-
vicers in deciding whether and how to renegotiate mortgage loan contracts.  
The data on loss severities in the study pools certainly point to strong eco-
nomic incentives for servicers to mitigate losses through loan modifica-
tions. 
C. Refinancing Option Fades Away 
To understand servicer behavior in negotiating loan modifications it is 
also important to understand the servicers’ and borrowers’ other options.  
In the first half of the study period, many homeowners were able to refi-
nance their mortgages, even if they were in default, thus perhaps reducing 
the need for modifications. 
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While it is clear that total residential mortgage debt in the United States 
reached a point that was not sustainable by the middle of 2007, that debt 
total did not shrink much as the crisis began to unfold.  From June 30, 2007 
to March 31, 2008, total residential mortgage debt actually continued to in-
crease, from $10.24 trillion to $10.61 trillion.66  The total mortgage debt in 
the sample loan pools shrank steadily during the study period, partly from 
refinancing and sales (payment in full) and partly from foreclosure liquida-
tions.  This shrinkage in outstanding balances in static mortgage pools does 
not, however, equate to an overall reduction in mortgage debt.  This is be-
cause until the middle of 2008 many mortgages were prepaid by refinanc-
ing with a new mortgage, typically at a higher balance to pay the refinanc-
ing costs.67 
Refinancing, while it solved the borrower’s and servicer’s immediate 
problem, did nothing to resolve the debt overhang, because the new mort-
gage will invariably bear a larger principal, especially when the borrower 
pays a prepayment penalty when refinancing within the first two or three 
years.68  Borrowers who refinanced were simply “kicking the can down the 
road,”69 increasing, not decreasing debt.  The study sample shows that the 
refinancing outcome was still fairly common in the last six months of 2007, 
but gradually disappeared during the first half of 2008.  In July 2007 there 
were 314 loans liquidated (foreclosed properties sold) compared with 2654 
loans paid in full via refinancing or sale.  By June 2008, however, the totals 
were nearly equal:  948 liquidations and 1036 loans paid in full.  The trend 
was generally consistent throughout the study period (see Figure 2). 
 
 66. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 8, at 8. 
 67. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, RISKING HOMES TO PAY OFF CREDIT CARDS 1 
(2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ip012-Risking_Homes_Credit_ 
Cards-1105.pdf. 
 68. Truth in Lending Act Regulation Z, 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (July 30, 2008) (55% of 
subprime borrowers in 2/28 ARM loans with prepayment penalties ended up paying the 
penalty). 
 69. SHEILA C. BAIR, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., STATEMENT ON THE STATE OF THE 
BANKING INDUSTRY (2008) (referring to short-term repayment plans by mortgage servicers 
as “kicking the can down the road”). 
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Figure 2:  Prepayments vs. Foreclosure Liquidations 
 
Surprisingly, refinancing continued long after the August 2007 freeze-up 
of the credit markets, and even into early 2008.  Nevertheless, by the final 
month of the study, June 2008, the refinancing (or voluntary sale) option 
was rapidly declining.  The option of refinancing obviously is more attrac-
tive for the servicer, because its investor receives payment in full, and the 
costs of negotiating a mortgage modification are avoided, along with the 
legal uncertainties.  The apparent reluctance to engage in large-scale modi-
fications may in part be explained by the continued viability of the refi-
nancing option, which shifted the debt problem from one economic actor to 
another, rather than tackling it head-on. 
Prepayment speeds slowed dramatically as the refinance market dried up 
and that option disappeared.  Prepayments include both foreclosure sales 
and payment in full resulting either from home sales or refinancing.  Prior 
to the August 2007 crisis subprime prepayments typically ran at an annual 
rate of 35% or more, so that a pool of mortgages would virtually all be re-
paid over five or six years.70  By June 2008 prepayment speeds in the loan 
 
 70. Prepayment speeds are calculated as conditional prepayment rates, which are a frac-
tion of the remaining loans outstanding, not a fraction of the original total.  Thus, if the pre-
payment speed remains at 35%, in the second year 35% of the remaining 65% of loans will 
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pools studied were running as low as 12%,71 and nearly half of all prepay-
ments were foreclosure liquidations.  These prepayment speeds would 
mean that it would take ten to fifteen years for the mortgages to be paid off 
(or foreclosed), suggesting a very drawn-out resolution process for the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. 
The declining number of monthly refinancing has serious implications.  
If the trend as of June 2008, of equal numbers of foreclosure liquidations 
and loans paid in full, continues, the final outcome for half of the remaining 
loans in the pools will be a foreclosure sale.  It also means that the REO in-
ventory will continue to accumulate and put downward pressure on home 
values. 
IV.  THE LOAN MODIFICATIONS—THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE 
EFFORT 
A. Virtually No Principal Reductions, Some Payment Reductions 
In the study sample of twenty-six loan pools over twelve months, there 
were a total of 4342 loan modifications reported.  The number of modifica-
tions increased from twenty-nine in July 2007 to a high of 880 in April, de-
clining somewhat to 582 in June, 2008, the final month covered (see Figure 
3).72  During the same twelve months, there were 19,911 foreclosures 
started and 8327 properties foreclosed and taken into REO. 
 
prepay, and so forth.  As the loan pool declines, so does the absolute number of prepay-
ments, at a constant prepayment speed. 
 71. This is the twelve-month average conditional prepayment rate as of June 25, 2008 
for the ABFC 2006-OPT3 (Option One) pool. 
 72. See HOPE NOW industry data, supra note 13.  The HOPE NOW report for June 
2008 also showed a decline in mortgage modifications from April to May, but showed an 
increase from May to June of 2008. 
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Figure 3:  Total Monthly Modifications. 
 
In the aggregate, the loan modifications failed to reduce the outstanding 
mortgage debt.  The amount owed on the modified loans went from $912 
million before modification to $933 million after modification.  A few 
loans did have their principal balance reduced, but only sixty-two (1.4%) of 
the 4342 modifications reduced the principal balance by more than 1%, and 
only forty (0.92%) reduced principal by more than 10%.  Some of these 
large principal reductions may have resulted from litigation. 
The most common forms of modifications involved either no change in 
interest, with a modest increase in principal (recasting arrears) or a reduc-
tion in the interest rate and payment with principal remaining the same or 
increasing slightly, in other words, interest-only reductions.  The increases 
in principal balances were likely due to capitalization of unpaid interest or 
other charges.  There were also significant numbers of rate freeze modifica-
tions, where the balance, rate, and payment remained essentially the same 
after modification. 
Thus, one of the two most important goals of the voluntary mortgage re-
structuring plan is not being achieved.  Without principal reductions, over-
all mortgage debt is not reduced, and homeowners continue to face the 
problem of negative equity, potentially for many years to come.  Without 
principal reductions, the only way debt will realign with property values is 
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through eventual foreclosures or short sales, or through the slow process of 
amortization of thirty-year loans. 
The news is slightly better regarding reduction in payment stress.  
Monthly mortgage payments were reduced in 54% of the modifications.  
On the other hand, 23% of reported modifications resulted in payment in-
creases, likely a product of recasting arrears.  The remaining 23% of modi-
fications did not change the monthly payment.73  The share of modifica-
tions with payment reductions increased somewhat over time (see Figure 
4). 
Figure 4:  Modification Effect on Monthly Payment 
 
The largest payment reduction involved a $730,000 mortgage in the 
Fremont HLT 2005A pool.  Without reducing the principal, and by reduc-
ing the interest rate from 12.1% to 4%, Fremont dropped the payment from 
$7,614 to $3,717 per month, which surely shows the power of interest rate 
modifications.  The average payment reduction for modifications with a 
payment reduction was $360.14 ($258 median reduction), and the average 
percentage reduction was 21%.  The reports do not disclose whether the 
payment changes are permanent or temporary. 
 
 73. There seemed to be some inconsistency in reporting, with a number of modifications 
reported as reducing interest rates significantly without changing either the principal or 
monthly payment, a highly unlikely outcome unless the term of the mortgage was signifi-
cantly altered.  The anomalous cases were not sufficiently numerous to affect the analysis. 
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Table 2:  Effect of Modifications on Monthly Payment 
 On the other hand, the average interest rate AFTER modification on all 
modified loans was 7.54% (7.4% median).  Given the near-complete ab-
sence of principal reductions and the still above-market interest rates being 
paid,74 the mortgage modifications of 2007–2008 should not be regarded as 
bailouts for the affected homeowners by any means. 
The modifications that did not change either the interest rate or the pay-
ment amounts are likely to have occurred when an adjustable interest rate 
was due to increase.  Servicers may have agreed to forego a scheduled rate 
and payment increase, either for a limited time or for the remainder of the 
mortgage term.  The HOPE NOW initiative in a December 2007 an-
nouncement encouraged these “rate freeze” modifications.75  Unfortunately 
the remittance reports do not include loan-level information regarding ad-
justable rate terms, before or after modification, but provide only the prin-
cipal, interest, and payment amount before and after modification. 
 
 74. The conventional mortgage rate for the week of August 11, 2008 was 6.52%, and 
was as low as 5.7% earlier in 2008.  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statistical 
Release, H.15 Selected Interest Rates (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/20080811/h15.pdf. 
 75. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 Payment Change Percent Cumulative Percent 
-1000 and up 135 3.1 3.1 
-900 to -1000 39 0.9 4 
-800 to -900 56 1.3 5.3 
-700 to -800 73 1.7 7 
-600 to -700 93 2.1 9.1 
-500 to -600 161 3.7 12.8 
-400 to -500 206 4.7 17.6 
-300 to -400 270 6.2 23.8 
-200 to -300 392 9 32.8 
-100 to -200 488 11.2 44.1 
0 to -100 1428 32.9 76.9 
0 to +100 632 14.6 91.5 
+>100 369 8.5 100 
Total 4342 100  
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Thus rate freezes and recasting of arrears (which increase payments and 
balances) accounted for about half the mortgage modifications in the 2007 
to 2008 period.  While slightly more than half of loan modifications in-
volved an interest rate reduction and resulting payment reduction, fewer 
than 1% reduced the actual mortgage balance.  Payment stress was thus re-
duced somewhat, and debt overhang not at all. 
B. Modifications Compared to Foreclosures 
To evaluate the overall scale of the voluntary modification effort, it is 
useful to compare the number of modifications of all kinds with the total 
number of delinquent loans, the number of new foreclosures started, and 
with the number lost to foreclosure. 
 
Table 3:  Modifications vs. Foreclosure Starts and Sales 
The number of modifications is significant, but still exceeded largely by 
the number of new foreclosures started each month, and the number of 
loans liquidated after disposition of a foreclosed property (see Table 2). 
C. Variability Among Servicers 
Mortgage servicers were far from consistent in their approach to loan 
modifications.  The number of modifications varied considerably among 
the different loan pools.  The two Park Place 2005 WHQ1 and WHQ 2 
pools (Argent originator, HomEq servicer) had none and one, respectively, 
while the Ace Securities 2006-FM1 pool (Fremont) had 701 modifications 
over twelve months.  Even comparing modifications to the number of liq-
uidated foreclosure properties, or the number of delinquent loans, the level 
of modification activity varied tremendously.  Each loan pool, of course, 
 Modifications Delinquent Loans 
Foreclosures 
Started 
Liquidated 
Loans 
Monthly aver-
age per pool 14 951 64 24 
Total all pools 
July 2007 27 19,375 1,412 314 
Total Dec. 
2007 467 25,170 1,783 511 
Total March 
2008 621 27,098 1,530 712 
Total June 
2008 582 27,470 1,868 948 
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varies in size, and is composed of loans with different characteristics, and 
the servicers may face different constraints on their ability to modify loans.  
Nevertheless, the variation remains striking.  To take one example, Option 
One modified 2% of its delinquent loans in one pool, 11% in an older pool, 
and 7.5% in a more recent pool.  Fremont modified 38%, 41.5%, and 56% 
of its delinquent loans over the course of the twelve months, compared with 
0% to 10% in a number of pools. 
 
Table 4:  12 month totals, Modifications vs. Delinquent Loans and Liqui-
dated Foreclosures by Pool 
 Liquidated Modified Delinq. (Max) Mods/Liq. Mods/ Delinq. 
Aames MIT 2005-4 459 476 1140 103.70% 41.75% 
Aames MIT 2006-1 281 157 673 55.87% 23.33% 
ABFC 2005-OPT1 99 42 381 42.42% 11.02% 
ABFC 2006-OPT1 349 26 1196 7.45% 2.17% 
ABFC 2006-OPT2 212 43 1140 20.28% 3.77% 
ABFC2006-OPT3 132 65 867 49.24% 7.50% 
ACE 2006-CW1 182 81 1159 44.51% 6.99% 
ACE  2006-FM1 560 701 1689 125.18% 41.50% 
FF MLT 2005-FF6 223 113 641 50.67% 17.63% 
FF MLT 2006-FF1 538 294 2316 54.65% 12.69% 
FF MLT 2006-FF11 381 129 2316 33.86% 5.57% 
Fremont HLT 
2005A 187 276 490 147.59% 56.33% 
Fremont HLT 
2006A 303 408 1084 134.65% 37.64% 
HISASC 2006-
WMC1 554 142 1171 25.63% 12.13% 
JPMorganMAT 
2006-CW2 213 67 1264 31.46% 5.30% 
Merrill Lynch MIT 
2006-WMC1 742 352 1374 47.44% 25.62% 
Park Place 2005 
WHQ1 621 1 1395 0.16% 0.07% 
Park Place 2005 
WHQ4 585 0 1783 0.00% 0.00% 
Renaissance HELT 
2005-1 68 155 537 227.94% 28.86% 
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 Liquidated Modified Delinq. (Max) Mods/Liq. Mods/ Delinq. 
Renaissance HELT 
2006-1 124 70 893 56.45% 7.84% 
SASCO 2006-BC6 230 47 1183 20.43% 3.97% 
Wells Fargo HET 
2005-1 183 116 785 63.39% 14.78% 
Wells Fargo HET 
2005-2 122 100 735 81.97% 13.61% 
Wells Fargo HET 
2005-4 132 134 813 101.52% 16.48% 
Wells Fargo HET 
2006-2 167 299 1226 179.04% 24.39% 
Wells Fargo HET 
2006-3 180 177 1621 98.33% 10.92% 
 
The type of modifications also varied considerably among pools and 
servicers.  Some servicers were much more likely to reduce monthly pay-
ments, while others limited their modifications to recasting or rate freezes 
that did not reduce monthly payments. 
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Figure 5:  Variability Among Servicers, Modification Quantity and Type 
D. Adjustable Rate Loans and the Payment Shock Issue 
Loan modification activity did not seem to relate to the timing of pay-
ment adjustments for adjustable-rate mortgages.  Although most of the 
pools studied included significant numbers of hybrid ARMs with high reset 
rates, there was no obvious correlation between peak loan modification ac-
tivity and the date on which most of the payments on the ARMs were due 
to adjust up (see Table 4).  Nor did there appear to be more modification 
activity in loan pools that had not reached their reset date than in pools that 
had passed their reset dates.  This evidence is consistent with the view that 
the payment adjustment issue is somewhat of a red herring, and that de-
faults, foreclosures, and workouts are driven by other factors, such as pay-
ments that were unaffordable at inception.76 
 
 76. See generally Foote et al., supra note 11. 
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Table 4:  Rate Resets and Month of Maximum Modification Activity 
Pool 
Peak 
Mods 
Peak 
Month 
Reset 
Peak 2/28s 3/27s Notes 
ACE Securities 
2006-CW1 17 5/25/08 4/15/08 52.00%   
Aames MIT 
2005-4 121 3/25/08 7/1/07 85.60%   
Aames MIT 
2006-1 33 2/25/08 12/1/07 63.50%   
Ace Securities 
2006-FM1 220 12/25/07 4/23/08 63.00%   
First Franklin 
MLT 2005-FF6 33 3/25/08 4/25/07 64.37% 16.82% 
63% 
are I/O 
First Franklin 
MLT 2006-FF11 38 3/25/08 9/1/08 63.00% 19%  
Fremont HLT 
2005A 35 8/25/07 12/1/06 81.00%   
Fremont HLT 
2006A 76 5/25/08 3/1/08 90.00%   
HISASC 2006-
WMC1 60 6/25/08 11/1/08 64.00% 11%  
Merrill Lynch 
MIT 2006-
WMC1 
227 4/25/08 12/1/07 74.50% 4%  
Renaissance 
HELT 2005-1 41 5/25/08 Fixed rate pool   
Renaissance 
HELT 2006-1 33 5/25/08 Fixed rate pool   
SASCO 2006-
BC6 19 4/25/08 10/1/08 60% 13%  
Wells Fargo 
HET 2005-1 22 6/25/08 4/1/07 83.50%   
Wells Fargo 
HET 2005-2 22 6/25/08 7/1/07 85.85%   
Wells Fargo 
HET 2005-4 32 4/25/08 10/1/07 85.16%   
Wells Fargo 
HET 2006-2 76 4/25/08 4/1/08 89.07%   
Wells Fargo 
HET 2006-3 38 6/25/08 10/1/08 74.46%   
E. Discussion 
The mortgage debt overhang continues to grow, and as of June 2008, de-
faults, foreclosures, and REO (foreclosed homes owned by mortgage ser-
vicers) continue to mount, adding to the glut of unsold homes and the drag 
on the economy.  The voluntary mortgage modification effort is providing 
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some relief for many homeowners, but is not, broadly speaking, having an 
impact on the debt crisis. 
The following salient points emerge from the data.  First, the number of 
defaults, foreclosures, and REO properties increased steadily throughout 
the 2007-2008 period studied, and are all at extraordinarily high levels. 
Second, loss severities are increasing rapidly, meaning that as the crisis 
unfolds, foreclosure sales will continue to glut the market with unsold 
properties and depress home values, while yielding progressively lower re-
turns for mortgage investors. 
Third, there are no signs in the study data of the crisis bottoming out or 
reaching a turning point, through June 2008.  Instead, the disappearance of 
refinancing and the acceleration of foreclosures means that the number of 
homes in foreclosure and REO will continue to grow, and at present rates 
will not be liquidated for several more years.  All things being equal, the 
2005 and 2006 loan pools in this study could take as many as ten years to 
process the delinquent loans into foreclosures, the foreclosures into REO, 
and to sell the REO, at present rates. 
Fourth, the effort to increase loan modifications has had some success, 
although the number of loans modified is still outstripped by loans being 
foreclosed, even at very high loss levels. 
Fifth, the modification effort is not solving the fundamental debt over-
hang problem, because principal balances are not being reduced.  The sub-
prime crisis is unique in the sense that banks and investors have already 
written off hundreds of billions of dollars of securities backed by subprime 
mortgages, but only a small fraction of those losses actually correspond to 
completed loan liquidations.  More importantly, homeowners have not been 
relieved of the devalued debt, either through completed foreclosure sales or 
loan concessions.  Many are still stuck in a “sweat box” struggling to pay 
above-market interest rates on above-market mortgage loans.77 
Sixth, only a bare majority of modifications involve any payment relief 
for borrowers, while many modifications are simply arrears capitalization 
arrangements that put borrowers in greater payment difficulty. 
Seventh, there is no consistency among servicers regarding their ap-
proach to mortgage modifications.  The HOPE NOW effort has not pro-
duced any uniformity in the approach to voluntary mortgage workouts.  In-
stead, there is huge variation among servicers in the quantity and quality of 
loan modifications.  Some had already begun modifications at the begin-
 
 77. See Ronald Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the Sweat Box of Credit Card Debt, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 384-92 (2007) (discussing how credit card banks profit from allowing 
delinquent borrowers to struggle in a “sweat box” of making partial payments and incurring 
late fees and penalties but not being cut off completely). 
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ning of the study period, some began in December or January after the pub-
lic announcements by Treasury and HOPE NOW, and some seemed reluc-
tant to engage in loan modifications until late in the study period, with a 
few modifications appearing first in March or April 2008, months after the 
crisis began and the exhortations to renegotiate had been made.  In some 
pools, 80% of modifications reduced the borrower’s monthly payment, 
while in others, 95% or more of modifications increased payments or left 
them unchanged. 
CONCLUSION 
The need for mortgage restructuring was clearly growing during the 
2007-2008 period, as delinquencies and losses progressively worsened.  
Given the choice between permanently writing down principal debt and in-
terest rates, or simply rescheduling unpaid payments, it is understandable 
that mortgage servicers would avoid the former option and favor the latter.  
Thorny questions of servicer authority are avoided, borrowers and their ad-
vocates are placated, and some foreclosures are avoided.  On the other 
hand, if the twin objectives are to reduce the unsustainable levels of sub-
prime mortgage debt, and to reduce the payment burden on mortgage bor-
rowers in or near default, the voluntary plan is not working.  Borrowers 
who remain indebted for amounts exceeding property values will retain the 
incentive to give up their valiant struggles to repay their subprime loans, 
and foreclosures will be delayed rather than prevented. 
The voluntary mortgage renegotiation plan, while it may be significantly 
reducing hardship for individual homeowners temporarily by curbing or de-
laying foreclosure sales, is doing little if anything to get at the underlying 
problem of debt overhang.  If things continue as they are, the losses, which 
have largely been recognized by the ultimate holders of the investments, 
will continue to be parsed out between mortgage servicers and homeowners 
for many years to come, and to be magnified by the senseless process of 
foreclosure and sale at losses of 50% or more in a distressed real estate 
market.  Without bankruptcy reform, legislated debt reduction, or a similar 
solution, the subprime crisis will drag on for years.78 
 
 78. See David Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Sweeping Housing Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2008.  As of this writing, legislation had just passed into law that would provide FHA-
insured refinance mortgages to homeowners with pre-2008 mortgages in payment distress 
who are able to persuade their servicer to accept payment of less than the full debt owed 
(90% of the value of the home, waiving all prepayment penalties and other fees).  American 
Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1402, 122 
Stat. 2654, 2800.  Although the legislation may stimulate servicers to reconsider their ap-
proach to defaulted mortgages, it still depends entirely on the willingness of the mortgage 
industry to write down principal voluntarily, a willingness that has not been evident to date. 
